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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. : 
ROGER ALLEN MALCOLM, ; Case No. 20080781 -CA 
Defendant/ Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)(j) (2008). The trial court entered judgment and conviction against Roger Allen 
Malcolm for murder, a first degree felony under Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-201 (2003) and 
76-5-203 (Supp. 2007). (See R. 219-20). The judgment is attached as Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION 
Whether the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury on important con-
cepts going to Malcolm's theory of the case as supported by the law and the evidence. 
Standard of Review: This Court reviews a trial court's refusal to give jury 
instructions for correctness, providing no deference to the trial court's ruling. State v. 
Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 238 (Utah 1992). Also, in considering whether a defendant was 
entitled to have the jury instructed on his defense, this Court will view the evidence and 
inferences that can be drawn from the evidence "in the light most favorable to the 
defense." State v. Syillers, 2007 UT 13, f 10, 152 P.2d 315. 
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Preservation: The issue was preserved in the record at 139-40; 207:388-98. 
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following provisions are relevant to the issue on appeal and set forth at 
Addendum B: Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-201 (2003); 76-5-203 (Supp. 2007); 76-2-403 
(2008); and 76-2-406 (2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings, Disposition in the Court Below 
On December 28, 2007, the State charged Malcolm with murder, a first degree 
felony offense. (R. 1-3). On April 2, 2008, the court conducted a preliminary hearing 
and bound Malcolm over for trial on the charge. (R. 29-30). 
On June 23, 2008, the trial court presided over the jury selection process for the 
three-day trial. (See R. 92-93; see also R. 104-09; 141-45; 153-54). On June 26, the jury 
found Malcolm guilty as charged. (R. 153-54,202-04). On August 25, 2008, the trial 
court sentenced Malcolm to a prison term of 15 years to life. (R. 219-20). On September 
4, 2008, Malcolm filed a notice of appeal. (R. 221). The appeal is timely. See Utah R. 
App. P. 3 & 4 (2008). Malcolm is incarcerated. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the afternoon of December 26, 2007, Malcolm stopped at Sapp Brothers Truck 
Stop on California Avenue in Salt Lake City on his way to work. (See R. 207:452; 
206:169 (identifying address)). He bought a sandwich from the Burger King inside the 
store, and he planned to buy a package of Orbit sweet mint gum from the convenience 
store. (See R. 207:453-54; see also 206:75 (stating the truck stop includes a convenience 
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store, two restaurants - a Burger King and a Great American Restaurant - a dentist's 
office, and a chiropractor's office); 206:78 (stating Malcolm was at the counter with a 
package of gum)). As Malcolm stood in line to pay for the gum, he realized the cashier 
in front of him was not helping customers. (R. 207:454-55; see also 206:117-18 (Chad 
Hinton also stood in line behind Malcolm without realizing the register was closed); 
206:137-38 (stating a line appeared to form in front of a closed cash register)). 
Witnesses testified that Malcolm became agitated or flustered (R. 206:118, 138), 
and he asked, "[D]o I need to stand over in that line?" referring to another cash register. 
(R. 207:455-46; see also 206:78-79, 95, 101 (stating Malcolm was disruptive, loud, and a 
little obnoxious); 206:139 (stating Malcolm was "talking kind of loudly and 
aggressively"); 206:146 (stating Malcolm asked, "Why can't I get any service around 
here?"); 206:155 (stating Malcolm was loud and belligerent); 206:171). Cashier Jodie 
Neeley responded, uNo, just wait one minute. We will be right with you." (R. 206:78). 
As a second cashier, Kaylene Allred, went to help Malcolm, the security guard Verne 
Jenkins stopped her and said, "No, not until he changes his attitude." (R. 206:78, 79, 95, 
102; see 207:456-57; see also 206:102 (stating Verne asked Malcolm to apologize); 
206:109-10 (stating Verne took the gum and kept it)). 
Verne was wearing a uniform, badge and utility belt with flashlight, handcuffs and 
pepper spray. {See R. 206:210, 248). He told Malcolm to leave. (R. 206:79, 103 (stating 
Verne "didn't raise his voice"; he was mellow and stern); see also 206:97-98 (stating 
Malcolm may have said, "All this is just for a piece of gum. All I want is gum." And 
Verne said, "No, you are being rude. You need to leave."); 206:141-42 (stating Verne 
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asked Malcolm to calm down or leave, and he used an authoritative tone); 207:457 
(Malcolm did not recall that Verne said anything)). Malcolm began to leave (R. 207:457-
58) when Verne "grabbed" or restrained him by the shoulder. (R. 206:79-80, 93, 146-47; 
207:458-59, 483-84). 
Malcolm pulled away (R. 206:94) and continued to the Burger King area for his 
bicycle. (See R. 206:129 (stating Malcolm was trying leave); 206:132, 202; 207:459). At 
that point, the men became involved in a struggle or a scuffle. (R. 206:80; 206:90; see 
also 206:104, 111 (Kaylene Allred stated the men were involved in a struggle and she 
heard the clang of a bike); 206:142-43, 147 (David Robison stated Malcolm went over to 
his bike and Veme grabbed him by the shoulder and the men "got in a scuffle"; also it 
looked like Malcolm tried to use his bike to make contact with Verne and to push Verne 
"off him"); 206:157-58 (Tyson Troxel stated the struggle started when "Vern[e] was 
trying to get his hands on [Malcolm]" to get him out of the store; also Veme had his arm 
in front of Malcolm's chest); 206:215-16 (Bryant Brown heard two men fighting)); (but 
see R. 206:172, 185 (Nicholas Moore claimed Malcolm grabbed the security guard); see 
also 206:174 (Moore did not "actually see" the fight begin; he "heard it" and "looked 
up"); 206:173-74 (Moore claimed Malcolm hit the guard in the jaw or face; also he 
acknowledged he did not actually see who hit whom, but he assumed Veme "probably 
got hit"); 206:183-84 (Moore acknowledged inconsistencies between his statements at 
trial and statements to police); 206:239 (Chance Hoover testified that Moore had his back 
to the individuals during the scuffle)). 
Witnesses testified that Veme had Malcolm in a headlock or chokehold (R. 206: 
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120, 125, 127, 131 (describing a headlock); 206:158 (describing Verne as starting the 
struggle; also stating Verne was placing his arms in front of Malcolm's chest)), and 
punches were thrown. (R. 206:80, 90-91, 94 (stating punches were thrown); 206:158-59 
(stating Malcolm hit Verne with the bike at least once)). Malcolm may have told Verne 
to get off him. (R. 206:182, 202, 216; 207:459). And Verne may have told Malcolm to 
cooperate and calm down. (R. 206:182). 
Also, Verne threw Malcolm to the ground and was on top of him. (R. 207:460, 
485-86; 206:125 (Chad Hinton stated Verne was "trying to take the customer down"); 
206:144 (David Robison stated the men "seemed to fall"); 206:159, 165 (Tyson Troxel 
stated the men were on the ground with Verne on top); 206:200, 201-03 (Lester Huff 
stated he "thought a cop or something [was] taking down somebody"); 206:229 (Chance 
Hoover testified that "it looked more like the security guard was trying to upper hand the 
situation" to get Malcolm "down on the ground"); 206:174 (Nicholas Moore claimed 
Verne took Malcolm to the ground "a couple of times" and Malcolm "popped right back 
up"); see also R. 207:310, 328, 474 (stating Verne was 31 years old and weighed 214 
pounds; Malcolm was 51 years old and weighed 180 pounds)). Malcolm had abrasions 
on his shin, knee and face, an eye injury, and red marks on his abdomen. (R. 207:430, 
434-35, 440-41). 
Malcolm testified that when Verne was on top of him, he felt attacked. (See R. 
207:447-48, 460-61). He thought Verne had a gun and was going for it. (R. 207:447-48, 
449; see also 207:491-92 (stating he saw the gun belt but could not recall if he saw the 
security guard's gun); 206:149 (a witness thought it was possible that Verne was armed)). 
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Malcolm drew his gun from a waistband holster and intended to fire a shot to warn 
Verne. (R. 207:447-48, 463, 486). He thought the safety was collapsed or disengaged. 
(R. 207:487). However, it was on, resulting in more force to squeeze the trigger than he 
anticipated. (See R. 207:448, 463-64, 487-89; see also 207:432 (stating the gun takes a 
good deal of pressure to release the safety and fire)). He fired the shot and it struck 
Verne. (R. 207:463-64). 
According to the deputy medical examiner, the projectile traveled horizontally 
through Verne's neck. (R. 207:318-19, 323-24 (also stating the weapon was at least two 
feet from the point of entry)). The shot was fatal. {See R. 207:313, 319, 321, 325). 
Verne collapsed on top of Malcolm. Malcolm pushed Verne off (R. 206:160-61; 
207:464), stood up, set the gun on a table or chair, and sat down to wait for police. (R. 
206:162; 207:464-65). Malcolm testified that during the encounter with Verne, he was 
prepared to shoot the gun but he did not intend to kill Veme. (See R. 207:466, 496-97; 
see also 201:413 (stating "you have to really be in a life-threatening situation" to use a 
gun); 207:498). 
Witnesses provided conflicting information as to what, if anything, Malcolm said 
after the encounter. (See R. 206:108, 113 (Kaylene Allred claimed Malcolm said Veme 
"deserved it, and so what?"; also, Malcolm had an indifferent look on his face); 206:144, 
148-49 (David Robison testified that Malcolm looked shocked, exhausted, ua bit dazed," 
and out of it); 206:162-63, 219, 242 (Tyson Troxel, Bryant Brown and Chance Hoover 
heard Malcolm say something about a pack of gum); 206:175-76, 181, 190 (Nicholas 
Moore testified that Malcolm looked like he was hurt and almost in shock; he was 
6 
mumbling and said , "I can't believe this is all over a pack of gum" and he may have 
called the security guard "an animal or something"); 206:211 (according to Lester Huff 
Malcolm said, "He should have let me go"); 206:252, 257 (Angela Simister testified that 
Malcolm said "Only once is all it takes," and his demeanor was smug); 206:267, 272, 273 
(William Clayton claimed Malcolm said, "The son of a b — wouldn't quit hitting me," 
and he was calm; also Clayton asked Malcolm "how many times he shot the guy," and 
Malcolm answered "once"); 206:284 (Regina Crookston testified that Malcolm stated 
Verne wanted to see his gun, and he "kept coming at me. What did he want me to do?"); 
206:291, 294 (according to Amy Starks, Malcolm said, "I shot the bastard," and he was 
cold and matter of fact); 207:466 (Malcolm testified that he said, "Yeah, that's my gun," 
and it was "all over a pack of g chewing gum")). 
A former medic assistant, William Clayton, rushed to Verne and began first aid 
(R. 206:263-64, 265; see 206:252), while shift manager Amy Starks went to Malcolm and 
screamed at him. (R. 206:162-63, 178-79, 255-56). He screamed back and called her "an 
idiot and moron." (R. 206:163; see also 206:292-93); (but see R. 206:204, 224-25 
(Lester Huff and Bryant Brown stated Malcolm got up when the person started yelling at 
him, then he sat down)). 
When officers arrived, Malcolm was calm and cooperative until they placed 
handcuffs on him. (See R. 207:404-05, 414). Officers testified that Malcolm became 
verbal and vulgar when restrained. (See R. 207:406-08; see also 207:414, 421 
(specifying that Malcolm was never physically resistant)). He told them to "[s]top hitting 
me." (R. 206:285). He responded with vulgarities when officers asked his name. (R. 
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207:380-81). He was aggressive and agitated and he yelled at officers when they 
searched him. (R. 207:418, 419). He was verbally argumentative and vulgar while in the 
patrol car and at the police station. (R. 207:410, 420; see also 207:423-24 (stating he was 
placed in an observation room at the police station and was angry and yelling)). He was 
belligerent and uncooperative when officers tried to swab his face for blood and take 
photos. (R. 207:385, 411, 495). He was "verbally argument [at] ive, up until the point 
where he was taken out of handcuffs, and then he became once again very compliant." 
(R. 207:412). Officers also testified that Malcolm made a statement "that he was acting 
in self-defense." (R. 207:415). 
The State presented evidence through several witnesses concerning the layout of 
the truck stop (see, e.g., R. 206:84-89 (State's Exhibit 14); 206:105-07 (State's Exhibit 
15); 206:121-26 (State's Exhibit 16); 206:136-37 (State's Exhibit 17); 206:234-37 
(State's Exhibit 21)), and it presented a DVD with images from security monitors. (See 
R. 206:298-99 (stating officers reviewed the video and requested only certain clips); 
207:346-49 (State's Exhibit 25); see also 207:358-59 (Defense Exhibits 1-52)). After the 
jury deliberated the evidence, it found Malcolm guilty of murder. (R. 208:576-77). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The defense requested instructions at trial for extreme-emotional-distress man-
slaughter and imperfect-legal-justification manslaughter. Those forms of manslaughter 
may apply if the circumstances support that prior to the shooting a reasonable person in 
the defendant's position would suffer distress; and/or if the circumstances support that a 
reasonable person in the defendant's position would believe he was entitled to defend 
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himself, although he may not be entitled to use deadly force. The evidence here 
supported both forms of manslaughter. Consequently, the trial court allowed the 
instructions. However, the trial court refused to instruct the jury on the use of force under 
the law to effect a citizen's arrest or to expel someone from property. 
Yet those instructions have a factual interconnection to the manslaughter 
alternatives at issue. Specifically, the facts support that the security guard, Verne 
Jenkins, used force to make a citizen's arrest against Malcolm and to expel him from the 
property. The evidence created a question of fact for the jury as to whether Verne's use of 
force was justified or unjustified and thereby provoked Malcolm into a physical 
confrontation. Where the evidence supported Verne's unjustified provocation, the jury 
also could find that such conduct would cause the reasonable person in Malcolm's 
position to suffer overwhelming distress, and it would cause the reasonable person to 
believe he was entitled to defend himself, although he may not be entitled to use deadly 
force. The evidence would support manslaughter. Since the trial court refused to instruct 
the jury on the relevant law, it effectively prevented the jury from resolving an important 
issue in the case: whether Veme unlawfully provoked Malcolm. The trial courts ruling 
resulted in prejudicial error. Malcolm respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
conviction and remand the case for a new trial with the proper jury instructions. 
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ARGUMENT 
A DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO HAVE THE JURY INSTRUCTED ON 
HIS THEORY OF THE CASE, 
Malcolm requested instructions that would assist the jury in deciding whether the 
defenses of extreme-emotional-distress manslaughter or imperfect-legal-justification 
manslaughter should apply. (SeeR. 139-40; 207:388-90, 397-98). The trial court 
rejected the instructions. (See R. 207:388-98) (attached hereto as Addendum C). The 
trial court erred. 
Under Utah law, and as a matter of fundamental fairness, a defendant has the right 
to have his "theory of the case presented to the jury in a clear and understandable way." 
State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75, 78 (Utah 1981); see also State v Castillo. 457 P.2d 618, 620 
(Utah 1969) (stating a defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed "fully and clearly" 
on the law of his defense); State v. Garcia. 2001 UT App 19, ffif 8-9, 18 P.3d 1123 
(recognizing that even where evidence is in conflict, the defendant is entitled to self-
defense instructions); State v. Ontiveros, 835 P.2d 201, 205 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (stating 
the defendant has a right to have his/hei "theory of the case presented to the jury in a 
clear and comprehensible manner"); State v. Aly, 782 P.2d 549, 550 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
(stating "[a] criminal defendant is entitled to have the gist of his defense reflected in the 
instructions given to the jury, and the instructions should not incorrectly or misleadingly 
state the material rules of law"); Jorzensen v. Issa, 739 P.2d 80, 82 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) 
(stating "[a] party is clearly entitled to have the jury instructed on his theory of the case"); 
Utah Const, art. I, § 7 (ensuring due process); U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1 (same). 
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Likewise, the trial court "has a duty to instruct the jury on the relevant law." State 
v. Low, 2008 UT 58, f 27, 192 P.3d 867; see also Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 238 (stating the 
trial court has the duty "to instruct the jury on the law applicable" to the case). "The 
purpose of the instructions is to set forth the issues and the law applicable thereto in a 
clear, concise and orderly manner, so that the jury will understand how to discharge its 
responsibilities." State v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694, 696 (Utah 1980). 
The instructions must be supported by the evidence, whether the evidence has 
been presented "by the prosecution or by the defendant." Low, 2008 UT 58, ^  25 (citing 
State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d 211, 214 (Utah 1985); Torres, 619 P.2d at 695). 
If the instruction charge as a whole already addresses the relevant concepts, the 
trial court may refuse to give the defendant's requested instructions to the jury. See_ State 
v. Sessions, 645 P,2d 643, 647 (Utah 1982) (stating "[i]t is not error to refuse a proposed 
instruction if the point is properly covered in the other instructions"); Ontiveros, 835 P.2d 
at 205 (stating the court will affirm on review "when the jury instructions taken as a 
whole fairly instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case"). 
Also, the Utah Supreme Court has specified that under the harmless-error doctrine 
or the prejudice prong it will assess whether "can element of the crime . . . is in dispute'" 
and whether the "'evidence is consistent with both the defendant's and the State's theory 
of the case.'" Spillers, 2007 UT 13, |^ 24 (ellipsis in original; quoting State v. Knight, 
2003 UT App 354, \ 17, 79 P.3d 969). In those circumstances, the trial court's failure to 
give the defendant's requested jury instructions is prejudicial: "'failing to instruct on the 
lesser included offense presumptively affects the outcome of the trial . . . [and] our 
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confidence in the verdict is undermined.'" IcL (ellipsis in original; quoting Knight, 2003 
UT App 354, ]^ 17); see also Potter, 627 P.2d at 78 (stating defendant was denied a fair 
trial "on the critical issues of the case" where the instructions were "so general" they 
"could have misled and confused the jury"). 
A. MALCOLM'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS ARE SUPPORTED BY THE 
LAW. 
Malcolm asked the trial court to instruct the jury on a person's use of force to 
make a citizen's arrest, and on a person's use of force to protect property. The proposed 
instruction for a person's use of force for an arrest stated the following: 
Any person is justified in using reasonable force, except deadly force, 
which he reasonably believes is necessary to effect an arrest. However, the person 
does so at his own peril [inasmuch as] the arrest must be legal. If the arrest is 
determined to be invalid or is without legal justification, the person making the 
arrest loses this justification and may be subject to criminal prosecution for, 
amongst other charges, unlawful detention and assault. Depending on the 
circumstances, the person making the illegal arrest could be charged with 
aggravated assault. 
(R. 139; 207:389-90) (attached as Addendum D). Malcolm's requested instruction is 
supported by the law. 
Specifically, the first sentence is contained in the Utah Code: Section 76-2-403 
defines a defense to criminal prosecution. It states that a person "is justified in using any 
force, except deadly force, which he reasonably believes to be necessary to effect an 
arrest or to defend himself or another from bodily harm while making an arrest." Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-2-403 (2008); see also Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-2-401(1) to 76-2-407 
(2008) (identifying additional defenses available in a criminal prosecution). Since the 
code contemplates that a person using force for a citizen's arrest may be charged with a 
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crime - and therefore entitled to assert the defense - it stands to reason that a person 
making such an arrest does so at his own peril and at the risk of being charged. 
Under Utah law, a private person - le^, a security guard - has the right "to make a 
citizen's arrest in narrowly defined circumstances." State v. Quada. 918 P.2d 883, 887 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996); see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-3(2008) (stating a "private person 
may arrest another" for an offense committed or attempted in his presence). In State v. 
Quada, the defendant "was awakened by the sound of birdshot hitting the siding of his 
residence." 918 P.2d at 885. The defendant grabbed a weapon, went outside, and 
hollered at the shooter, Bridger. hL When Bridger failed to respond, the defendant fired 
two rounds "sighting off 15 feet from where Bridger was walking." IcL Bridger turned 
around and the defendant instructed him to place his hands over his head. IcL Bridger's 
father became involved and defendant instructed him to place his hands in the air. IcL 
Defendant ultimately was arrested and charged with two counts of aggravated assault for 
use of a dangerous weapon likely to produce death or serious injury. IcL The jury 
convicted as charged and defendant appealed claiming he was entitled to an instruction 
on a person's use of force to effect an arrest. Id_ at 886-87. This Court disagreed. 
It ruled that based on the circumstances of the charged offense, the jury found that 
"defendant used a dangerous weapon likely to produce death or serious bodily injury." 
Id. at 887. Thus, it found that defendant used "'deadly force.'" IcL (citation omitted). 
Since the defense of a citizen's arrest does not apply in situations where the actor has 
used deadly force, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-403, the defendant in Quada would not be 
entitled to an instruction on the matter. Quada, 918 P.2d at 887. 
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Under the reasoning of Quada, the statutory use of force to make an arrest may 
apply if the force at issue does not constitute aggravated assault with a dangerous weapon 
or deadly force. See_ id^ Indeed, the underlying force for the arrest may give rise to a 
charge for a lesser offense: Le^, assault or unlawful detention. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 
76-5-102 (2008) (defining assault as an attempt or threat to do injury with unlawful force 
or violence, or an act of unlawful force or violence for injury to another); 76-5-304 
(2008) (defining unlawful detention as detaining or restraining a victim intentionally or 
knowingly, without authority of law, and against the victim's will). 
Thus, if a private person uses force to make an arrest, he may be subject to 
criminal prosecution for assault or unlawful detention, and he may assert the defense. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-403. Moreover, if the private person has engaged in conduct for 
the citizen's arrest that amounts to aggravated assault, the person may not rely on the 
defense at § 76-2-403 as justification for his conduct. See Quada, 918 P.2d at 887. 
Those concepts were set forth in Malcolm's instruction for a person's use of force to 
make an arrest. (R. 139 (setting forth statutory language for a person's use of force to 
effect an arrest; specifying that a private person making an arrest does so at his own peril 
since he may be subject to criminal prosecution; stating that if a citizen's arrest is invalid 
or without justification, the person making the arrest may face prosecution for unlawful 
detention and assault, among other charges; and depending on the circumstances, a 
person purportedly making an arrest may be charged with aggravated assault)). 
Next, Malcolm proposed the following instruction for a person's use of force to 
protect property. 
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A person is justified in using reasonable force, other than deadly force, 
against another, when and to the extent that he reasonably believes that force is 
necessary to prevent or terminate criminal interference with real property or 
personal property; 
1) lawfully in his possession; or 
2) belonging to a person whose property he has a legal duty to protect. 
However, a person may only use force to remove the person from real 
property if the person to be removed refuses to leave, damages property, or 
threatens the safety of others. 
(R. 140; 207:397-98) (attached as Addendum E). Malcolm's requested instruction is 
supported by the law. The first paragraph parrots language from Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-
406. The section states the following: 
A person is justified in using force, other than deadly force, against another when 
and to the extent that he reasonably believes that force is necessary to prevent or 
terminate criminal interference with real property or personal property: 
(1) Lawfully in his possession; or 
* * * 
(3) Belonging to a person whose property he has a legal duty to protect. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-406 (2008). 
The second paragraph describes criminal interference: that is, instances when 
force may be justified to expel another from property. See_ id^ Criminal interference may 
include trespass, criminal mischief, or the like. See, e.g., Griego v. Wilson, 570 P.2d 612, 
613 (N.M. Ct, App. 1977) (upholding the trial court's findings that a business proprietor 
was justified in restraining a customer after cautioning him to stop; the customer was 
angry, abusive, and obscene, and he advanced on an employee causing the proprietor to 
be apprehensive that the customer was "about to attack" the employee); Watkins v. Sears 
Roebuch&Co., 735 N.Y.S.2d 75 (N.Y. App. Div. 1. 2001) (recognizing that a security 
guard may use non-deadly force against a shoplifter); Scheufele v. Newman, 210 P.2d 
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573, 576 (Or. 1949) (recognizing that "'[a] person aggrieved by a trespasser may repel 
the intruder by such force as may be reasonably necessary" and specifying when the 
aggrieved party may use a weapon) (citations omitted). 
Under Utah law, trespass occurs when an actor enters or remains unlawfully on 
property with the intent to cause annoyance or injury, with the intent to damage property 
or to commit a crime, or with recklessness as to whether his presence will cause fear for 
the safety of another. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206(2) (2008). That offense may qualify 
as "criminal interference with [] property." Utah Code Ann. 76-2-406; see also id. at § 
76-6-106 (2008) (defining criminal mischief where the actor damages, defaces or 
destroys property, or tampers with property thereby recklessly endangering life or safety). 
Where the law allows an actor to use force against a person to prevent or terminate 
criminal interference - including trespass where the person remains on property to cause 
annoyance, to damage property, or to threaten the safety of others, see_ Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-206(2) - those concepts were set forth in Malcolm's requested instruction. (R. 140 
(setting forth statutory language for use of force to protect property, and specifying that a 
person is justified in using such force when another has engaged in conduct constituting 
trespass)). In this case, neither the prosecutor nor the trial court disputed any specific 
part of Malcolm's instructions as an incorrect statement of the law. (See R. 207:388-98; 
see also R. 207:391 (recognizing that Verne can "either make an arrest or he can't"); 
207:395, 396 (stating the jury should decide whether Verne could use force to make 
Malcolm leave the store)). The requested instructions were proper. 
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B. MALCOLM'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS ARE SUPPORTED BY THE 
EVIDENCE. 
"It is defendant's right to have the jury instructed on his theory of the case so long 
as the requested instruction is warranted by the evidence presented at trial." State v. 
Valdez, 604 P.2d 472, 473 (Utah 1979). In assessing whether the trial court should have 
given Malcolm's requested instructions, this Court will view the facts and the reasonable 
inferences "'in the light most favorable to the defense.'" Spillers, 2007 UT 13, ^ 10 
(citation omitted). It will not concern itself with the reasonableness or credibility of the 
evidence since those issues are for the jury. See_ Torres, 619 P.2d at 695. This Court will 
decide only "whether there is a sufficient quantum of evidence presented to justify 
sending the question to the jury, a decision which must be made concerning all jury 
instructions in any trial." State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 159 (Utah 1983); see_ State v. 
Law, 147 P.2d 324, 327 (Utah 1944) (whether defendant had a reasonable basis to believe 
his adversary would take his life or do him great bodily harm was a jury question); State 
v. Turner, 79 P.2d 46, 52, 54 (Utah 1938) (whether defendant's adversary provoked him 
was a jury question). 
In this case, the evidence supported Malcolm's requested instructions. 
Specifically, witnesses testified that before the shooting, they observed that Malcolm was 
agitated and flustered in the convenience-store area of the Sapp Brothers Truck Stop. 
(SeeR. 206:118, 138; see also 206:79, 95, 101 (stating Malcolm was disruptive, loud and 
a little obnoxious); 206:139 (stating Malcolm was talking loudly and aggressively); 
206:146 (stating Malcolm asked, "Why can't I get any service around here?"); 206:155 
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(stating Malcolm was loud and belligerent); 206:171). Verne Jenkins, the security guard, 
responded by expressing that Malcolm needed to leave. (R. 206:79, 103; see also 206: 
97-98 (stating Malcolm may have said. "All this is just for a piece of gum. All I want is 
gum." And Verne said, "No, you are being rude. You need to leave."); 206:141-42 
(stating Verne asked Malcolm to calm down or leave and he used an authoritative tone)). 
While Malcolm was in the process of collecting his bicycle from the Burger King 
area to leave (R. 207:457-58), Veme used force and initiated a physical altercation 
against him. (R. 206:79-80, 93, 147; 207:458-59, 483-84; see also 206:94 (Malcolm 
pulled away); 206:125, 127 (stating Veme tried to take Malcolm down; stating Veme 
took Malcolm in a headlock and the witness thought it was just "typical security guard 
action"); 206: 131-32 (stating Veme placed Malcolm in a headlock in an effort to detain 
him and to get him to leave); 206:142-43, 147 (stating Malcolm went over to his bike and 
Veme grabbed him by the shoulder and the men "got in a scuffle"); 206:157-58 (stating 
the stmggle started when "Vern[e] was trying to get his hands on [Malcolm]" to get him 
out of the store; and describing Veme as having his arm in front of Malcolm's chest)). 
The evidence supports that Veme used physical force to detain Malcolm or to 
make a citizen's arrest as Malcolm was trying to leave; also Veme used physical force to 
expel Malcolm from the premises. (See supra, pp. 17-18, herein; see also R. 208:547-48 
(prosecutor recounted witness testimony that Veme tried to "detain" or "restrain" 
Malcolm; and Veme used physical force in an effort to get Malcolm "to leave the store" 
after Malcolm mumbled something); 208:564-65 (prosecutor claimed that the "only 
mistake Veme made" was in trying to restrain Malcolm)). Consequently, the jury should 
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have been instructed as to when a person may use force to make a citizen's arrest and/or 
to expel someone from property. (See supra. Argument A., herein; see also R. 139; 140 
(requested instructions)). Those instructions would have allowed the jury to consider the 
evidence in context to resolve important questions of fact. 
Specifically, the jury should have been allowed to decide whether Verne initiated 
the physical confrontation to make an arrest or to expel Malcolm from property; whether 
Verne used lawful or unlawful force in that regard; whether Verne was unjustified in his 
conduct; and/or whether he deliberately and unlawfully provoked Malcolm. (See, e.g., R. 
207:457-59 (stating Malcolm was collecting his bike to leave when Verne initiated a 
physical attack); see also 208:533-34 (defense counsel argued that Verne did not have 
justification to attack Malcolm or to escort him from the property with force); 208:535, 
537-38, 542-43, 544 (defense counsel argued that Malcolm was asked to leave, he was 
leaving, and Veme used physical force; also physical force was unjustified where 
Malcolm did not threaten anyone or destroy property); but see R. 157; 155 (advising the 
jury that closing argument from the attorneys is not evidence; and admonishing the jury 
that it must rely on the instructions for the law)). 
Those questions were relevant in considering whether Verne's provocation would 
cause a reasonable person to suffer overwhelming distress or to believe that he was en-
titled to defend himself, although he may not be entitled to use deadly force. See, e.g., 
Spillers, 2007 UT 13, Iffl 12, 16-23 (recognizing that when the evidence is ambiguous and 
susceptible to different interpretations, the jury should be instructed on the applicable 
law; also evidence supporting that the deceased initiated a physical attack against the 
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defendant would support extreme emotional distress and imperfect legal justification); 
State v. Johnson, 185 P.2d 738, 744 (Utah 1947) (citing cases from other jurisdictions to 
support that when the evidence raises questions going to justification or provocation, the 
jury should be instructed on the matter); Turner, 79 P.2d at 52, 54 (stating the issue of 
provocation is for the jury). 
Indeed, there was a factual interconnection between Malcolm's requested 
instructions on a person's use of force, and his defense for imperfect-legal-justification 
manslaughter and extreme-emotional-distress manslaughter. (See R. 173-80 (jury 
instructions for manslaughter alternatives)). Specifically, the defense of imperfect legal 
justification applies "when the defendant caused another's death 'under a reasonable 
belief that the circumstances provided a legal justification or excuse for his conduct 
although the conduct was not legally justifiable or excusable under the existing 
circumstances.'" Spillers, 2007 UT 13, Tf 22 (emphasis added; citation omitted). If the 
evidence supports that the defendant "was entitled to defend himself. . . but [was] not 
entitled to use deadly force" when the victim initiated a physical encounter, those facts 
"create a question of fact" for the jury. hL_ at \ 23 (emphasis added; ellipsis in original; 
citation omitted). 
Likewise, the defense of extreme emotional distress applies if evidence supports 
that the defendant caused the person's death under distress "for which there is a reason-
able explanation or excuse.'" Id_ at ^ 13 (citation omitted). The "reasonableness of [the] 
explanation or excuse" requires the jury to consider whether the circumstances are such 
that the reasonable person would suffer distress. See_ icL_ In that regard, 
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A person suffers extreme emotional distress when exposed to "'extremely unusual 
and overwhelming stress5 such that the average reasonable person" would react by 
experiencing a loss of self-control. In such a situation, a person's reason would be 
overwhelmed by intense feelings, such as passion, anger, distress, grief, or 
excessive agitation. 
IcL at If 14 (citations omitted). 
The extreme-emotional-distress defense applied in Spillers, where the evidence 
supported that the victim initiated a physical encounter by striking the defendant on the 
back of the head. /# at If 16. As a result of the blow, the defendant felt "cloudy, dazed, 
uncomfortable, and scared." IcL He responded by firing a weapon at the victim "three 
times, although at trial" his recollection was faulty: "he testified that he remembered 
firing only a single shot." IcL The State argued that defendant Spillers' description of the 
encounter and his deliberate conduct in shooting the victim supported that he "acted 
'rationally' throughout the encounter." IcL at f 18. The supreme court considered that 
interpretation, but ruled that the State's theory would not end the analysis. See id. 
According to the court, if the evidence is susceptible to different interpretations 
and the jury could infer that a reasonable person would suffer distress under the 
circumstances, it must be properly instructed on the matter. See_ id, at fflf 19-20. The 
question of the parties' conduct is for the jury to decide. See uL at ^ 18. The jury may 
"adopt the State's version of events" for murder and "also believe" that defendant "was 
not acting rationally, but rather was under extreme emotional distress as a result of [the 
victim's] attack" for a manslaughter conviction. Id/, see also Johnson, 185 P.2d at 743 
(stating "a rapidly developing situation might so confuse, enrage, or mentally disturb a 
reasonable person that he would/az7 to appreciate that serious consequences might result 
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from his acts") (emphasis added). 
Since those alternative forms of manslaughter were before the jury in Malcolm's 
case (R. 173-180), Malcolm's requested instructions - concerning a person's use of force 
to make an arrest or to expel someone from property - would have assisted the jury in 
sorting through the issues to find that Veme initiated an unlawful altercation to provoke 
Malcolm for application of the manslaughter alternatives. Indeed, when defense counsel 
requested the instructions at trial, he pointed out that based on the evidence, the jury may 
believe "that [Veme] was arresting Mr Malcolm" and it may believe that "it was legal 
for [Veme] to be the aggressor in this altercation" and to use force against Malcolm in his 
capacity as a security guard. (R. 207:390-91, 392, 393). Thus, it would be "necessary to 
clarify for the jury" when force may be justified or unjustified for an arrest or in defense 
of property. (R. 207:391, 395 (stating that since there was no evidence that Malcolm 
committed a crime as he was leaving the store, Veme was not justified in using physical 
force)); see also J or gens en, 739 P.2d at 82 (recognizing that failure to give instructions 
constitutes error if it tends to mislead the jury). 
The prosecutor seemed to agree that evidence was in dispute on that point. (See R. 
207:394). Moreover, the judge agreed that the facts created an issue "for the jury to 
decide." (R. 207:395). "[T]he jury is going to have to determine, based on the evidence 
or lack of evidence, the facts in this case and what happened or didn't happen. And may-
be they'll have enough evidence; maybe they won't. That's the State's burden." (R. 207: 
395-96). The judge acknowledged that a security guard can say, "leave the premises" (R. 
207:396), and he acknowledged that the issue of physical force is "what the jury is here 
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to find out"; also, "all of that is up to the jury to decide." (R. 207:3963 397). Notwith-
standing, the trial court refused to give Malcolm's requested instructions. (R. 207: 397). 
That was tantamount to preventing the jury from deciding if Verne's conduct was unlaw-
ful and constituted unjustified provocation for application of the manslaughter defenses. 
In addition, the court ruled that the instructions as a whole were sufficient where 
they admonished the jury that Verne Jenkins was "an ordinary, everyday person" and 
"can be treated just like anybody else." (R. 207:397; see, e.g., R. 195); (but see infra 
Argument C, herein). 
Yet that was not enough. An "ordinary, everyday person" may or may not be 
justified in using force for an arrest or to expel another from property. See, e.g. Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 76-2-403; 76-2-406; (supra, Argument A., herein). The jury should have 
been instructed on those matters. Stated another way, if Verne - an ordinary, everyday 
person - used unlawful force or was not justified in arresting Malcolm or expelling him 
from property, those facts would support unlawful provocation, and such provocation 
may cause a reasonable person in Malcolm's position to suffer overwhelming distress 
and/or to believe he could defend himself, although he may not be entitled to use deadly 
force. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(4) (defining the manslaughter defenses). 
Those concepts were not properly conveyed to the jury. (See infra. Argument C.) 
Malcolm's requested instructions would have given the jury context and guidance. 
(See, e.g., R. 155 (instructing the jury that it must decide the facts from the evidence and 
it must "take the law I give you in the instructions" and "apply it to the facts")); see also 
Spillers, 2007 UT 13, ^ 16, 23 (recognizing that the evidence would support that the 
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deceased was the aggressor in the attack and under those circumstances it would support 
instructions for extreme emotional distress and imperfect legal justification); State v. 
Ross, 501 P.2d 632, 635 (Utah 1972) (recognizing that "provocation" is an issue for the 
jury in determining manslaughter). They were pertinent to his defense. See Spillers, 
2007 UT 13, ^ f 19 (stating as long as evidence supports defendant's theory, he "is entitled 
to the jury instruction if he requests it"). The trial court erred in failing to give the 
instructions to the jury, Ontiveros, 835 P.2d at 205 (stating the trial court has a duty to 
instruct the jury on the law applicable to the facts). 
C. THE JURY CHARGE AS A WHOLE DID NOT ADDRESS THE 
RELEVANT CONCEPTS CONTAINED IN MALCOLM'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTIONS. 
Under the law, the defenses of imperfect-legal-justification manslaughter and 
extreme-emotional-distress manslaughter will serve to reduce murder to manslaughter. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(4). The defenses may apply if the evidence supports, for 
example, that the victim initiated an attack against the defendant, and the defendant re-
acted by killing the victim. See, e.g., Spillers, 2007 UT 13, fflf 16, 23; State v. Shumway, 
2002 UT 124, ffll 11-13, 14, 63 P.3d 94; see also State v. Padilla, 776 P.2d 1329, 1330 
(Utah 1989) (recognizing that extreme-emotional-distress manslaughter incorporates the 
heat-of-passion standard); State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 428 (Utah 1986) (recognizing 
that if the evidence supports alternative theories, the jury must be instructed on the appro-
priate alternatives); State v. Howell 649 P.2d 91, 93 (Utah 1982) (identifying evidence 
for manslaughter where an individual and the defendant engaged in an altercation 
prompting the defendant to retrieve his gun, and when he returned, two other individuals 
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initiated successive physical encounters against the defendant and he responded by 
killing one and wounding the other; also recognizing that manslaughter alternatives are 
consistent with intentional conduct); Ross, 501 P.2d at 635 (stating provocation is an 
element for the jury). 
Malcolm's requested instructions for use of force to make an arrest or to expel 
another from property would have advised the jury on important points of law. (R. 139; 
140; see also supra, Argument B., herein). The instructions would have allowed the jury 
to find that Verne was not justified in using force, and his unlawful use of force would 
cause a reasonable person to suffer overwhelming distress and to believe he could defend 
himself for application of the manslaughter alternatives. See, Spillers, 2007 UT 13, fflf 
16, 23; Shumway, 2002 UT 124, ffif 11-13, 14. 
Indeed, the trial court's instructions failed to admonish the jury on those important 
concepts. (See R. 155-99) (attached hereto as Addendum F). The instructions failed to 
explain the circumstances in the context of this case and in a way that would allow the 
jury to consider whether Verne's use of force was justified or not. (See R. 155-99). 
Specifically, the trial court's instructions advised the jury on the basic elements for 
murder, manslaughter, and negligent homicide. (See R. 171-184). They advised the jury 
on perfect self defense. (R. 190-94). The instructions advised the jury that an actor is 
justified in threatening or using force against another person to the extent the actor 
"reasonably believes that force is necessary to defend himself or other third parties 
against the other person's "imminent use of unlawful force." (R. 185 (also stating deadly 
force is justified if the actor reasonably believes it is necessary to prevent death or serious 
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injury as a result of another person's imminent unlawful force, or to prevent a forcible 
felony)). The instructions defined "unlawful[]"to mean without legal justification. (R. 
168, 182). And they defined "imminen[t]" or reasonableness with reference to factors, 
where the jury could consider the "nature" and "immediacy" of the danger, the 
probability that the force would result in death or serious injury, the other person's "prior 
violent acts" or "propensities," and "any patterns of abuse or violence" in the relationship 
between the actor and the other person. (R. 187). 
The trial court's use-of-force instructions were insufficient for two reasons. First, 
to the extent the jury applied the trial court's use-of-force instructions to assess whether 
Malcolm - as the actor - was justified in using force to defend against Verne's conduct, 
the instructions left a gap. That is, the instructions failed to give the jury any guidance as 
to when Verne's use of force may be lawful or unlawful - te^ to make an arrest or to 
expel Malcolm from the property - to support that Malcolm in fact was justified to use 
force, although he was not justified to use deadly force. (See R, 155-99 (instructions as a 
whole)). Thus, while the evidence created an issue of fact for the jury (see supra, 
Argument B., herein), the jury was not able to resolve the issue since it was not instmcted 
as to when Verne's conduct may be considered unlawful in the context of this case. (R. 
155-99). 
Second, to the extent the jury applied the trial court's use-of-force instructions to 
assess whether Veme - as the actor - was justified in tlireatening or using force to defend 
himself or others against Malcolm's conduct, the instructions again left a gap. That is, 
the jury should have been instmcted as to whether Verne could use force to make an 
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arrest or to expel Malcolm from property. (See R. 139: 140). Those instructions would 
have given guidance to the jury in assessing whether Verne's use of force was proper. If 
Verne was not justified to use force under any of the alternatives set forth in the 
instructions (i.e., to defend against "imminent" and "unlawful" force (R. 185), to make an 
arrest (R. 139), or to expel another from property (R. 140)), the jury could find that Verne 
provoked Malcolm. See, e.g., Hansen, 734 P.2d at 428 (recognizing that when the 
evidence supports alternative theories, the trial court must instruct the jury). 
Next, the trial court's instructions stated that a person is "not justified in using 
force" if he "initially provoke[d] the use of force against himself with the intent to use 
force as an excuse to inflict" harm; if he attempted to commit, committed, or was fleeing 
from the commission of a crime; or if he were the aggressor. (R. 186). Again, that in-
struction was insufficient for two reasons. First, if the jury relied on it to assess whether 
Malcolm was "not justified" in using force, the instruction left a gap: it failed to advise 
whether Verne's conduct in using force to arrest or expel Malcolm from the property was 
justified or not, (See R. 139; 140). If the jury had been properly instructed, it could find 
that Verne's conduct in using force was not justified. Also, it could find that Malcolm 
reasonably believed he could use force - since under the law he did not initially provoke 
the physical encounter; he was not committing or attempting to commit, or fleeing from a 
crime; and he was not the aggressor. (See, e.g., supra. Argument B., herein). 
Second, if the jury relied on the trial court's instruction to assess whether Verne 
was "not justified" in using force (R. 186), the instructions were deficient. The jury 
should have been advised as to when the use of force for an arrest or to expel someone 
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from property may be justified. (See, e.g.% R. 139; 140). It then could assess whether 
Verne's conduct was justified or not under the law. 
Finally, the trial court's instructions advised the jury that for extreme emotional 
distress, the distress must be triggered by something external. (R. 175). Also, the 
instructions advised that imperfect legal justification may apply if the evidence "tends to 
show that the defendant acted under circumstances where he believed he was entitled to 
defend himself although under the law he was not entitled to use deadly force." (R. 178) 
While the evidence supported the defenses (see supra. Argument B.), the jury was not 
allowed to assess the defenses in the context of whether Verne was justified to use force 
for an arrest or to remove Malcolm from property; or whether his use of force was 
unjustified, thereby triggering distress and a reasonable belief that Malcolm was entitled 
to defend himself. The instructions viewed as a whole failed to cover the concepts. 
In short, the trial court's instructions advised the jury on the basic elements for 
murder, manslaughter, and negligent homicide; and on perfect self defense. (See R. 168, 
171-184; 190-94). They explained that an actor could use force if he believed it was 
necessary to defend against unlawful force (185); they explained that "unlawful[]" force 
was illegal force. (R. 168, 182). They explained that the jury could consider the need to 
use force based on several factors including the nature and immediacy of the danger, the 
level of the unlawful force, prior acts or propensities, and the history of the parties. (R. 
187). The instructions explained circumstances under which a person may not be 
"justified in using force." (R. 186). And they explained that extreme emotional distress 
must be triggered by something external, and an imperfect legal justification required a 
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reasonable belief that the defendant was entitled to defend himself. (R. 175; 178). Not-
withstanding these salient concepts, the instructions failed to explain when force may be 
legal for a citizen's arrest or to remove a person from property. (See R. 155-99). In that 
regard, the jury was not allowed to consider whether Verne's actions in initiating the 
physical encounter to make an arrest and to expel Malcolm from the store was lawful or 
whether his actions were unjustified for application of the manslaughter alternatives. (Id.) 
D. THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO GIVE MALCOLM'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTIONS CONSTITUTES PREJUDICIAL ERROR. 
In this case, as stated supra, the evidence supported the alternative theories for the 
defense of extreme-emotional-distress manslaughter and imperfect-legal-justification 
manslaughter. (See, e.g., supra, Argument B., herein). The evidence also supported 
instructions on when a person can make a citizen's arrest with use of force, and when a 
person may be justified in using force to expel another from property. (Id.) Malcolm's 
instructions on a person's use of force would have allowed the jury to consider the facts 
in the context of the law to find that the victim, Verne Jenkins, initiated a physical 
confrontation with Malcolm that was excessive and unlawful, thereby supporting that 
Verne unjustifiably provoked Malcolm into a physical confrontation prior to the shooting. 
In addition, the instructions would have allowed the jury to find that Verne's conduct 
would cause a reasonable person to suffer overwhelming distress, and to believe that he 
was entitled to act in self defense, although he may not be entitled to use deadly force. 
Evidence was presented to support the instructions (id.), and as acknowledged by the trial 
court, the evidence created questions of fact for the jury. (See R. 207:395-97). That is 
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enough to support prejudice. 
As recognized in State v. Knight, "when an element of the crime . . . is in dispute, 
and the evidence is consistent with both the defendant's and the State's theory of 
the case, failing to instruct on the lesser included offense presumptively affects the 
outcome of the trial . . . [and] our confidence in the verdict is undermined." 2003 
UT App 354, ^ 17, 79 P.3d 969. Clearly, the case at hand meets these criteria. 
Spillers, 2007 UT\3 A 24. 
Indeed, Malcolm was not obligated in this case to present the evidence for the 
requested instructions or to prove their relevance to the jury for the manslaughter 
alternatives. See Spillers, 2007 UT 13, ^ 19. "A defendant is not required to testify at all, 
nor is he required to present any evidence at trial; he 'may simply point to ambiguities or 
inconsistencies in the evidence presented by the State and require the State to prove every 
element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Id, "[A] defendant in a criminal 
case bears no burden of persuasion." IcL '"The ultimate burden of proving the 
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt remains on the state, whether defendant 
offers any evidence in an effort to prove affirmative defenses or not.5" IcL (citation 
omitted). It is enough that the State's evidence has created the jury questions at issue, 
and it is enough that the evidence '"or lack thereof [has] create[d] a reasonable doubt as 
to any element of the crime.'" IcL (citation omitted). 
In this case, the jury found Malcolm guilty of intentional homicide. {See R. 202). 
That offense is consistent with the following evidence: Verne used force to make a 
citizen's arrest (see, e.g., supra, pp. 17-18, herein); the force for an arrest was not 
justified {see R. 139); Verne used force to expel Malcolm from the premises {see, e.g., 
pp. 17-18, herein); the force was not justified under the circumstances since Malcolm was 
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already in the process of leaving the store on his own (see id.: see also R. 140); Verne's 
unlawful use of force provoked Malcolm and MalcoJm suffered overwhelming distress as 
a result of Verne's attack; also the distress was such that he did not fully appreciate the 
consequences of his actions. (See supra, Argument B., herein). Moreover, Malcolm was 
justified in defending himself although he was not justified in using deadly force. (See 
id.) The evidence and the conviction are consistent with Malcolm's requested 
instructions. "As long as the evidence presented at trial supports a defendant's theory of 
the crime and provides a rational basis for a verdict on the lesser included offense, a 
defendant is entitled to the jury instruction if he requests it." Spillers, 2007 UT 13, f 19. 
While the evidence may be consistent with other defenses and/or lesser offenses, 
that does not undermine the importance of Malcolm's requested instructions here. As the 
Utah Supreme Court has recognized, "Society has a legitimate interest in the jury's 
freedom to act according to the evidence." Hansen, 734 P.2d at 424 (citation omitted). 
"A primary purpose of a criminal trial is the vindication of the laws of a civilized society 
against those who are guilty of transgressing those laws. The process, however, must be 
based on procedures which are consonant with fairness both to the defendant and the 
State." Howell 649 P.2d at 94. "It is the duty of the judge to instruct the jury on [the] 
relevant law." Hansen, 734 P.2d at 428. If the trial court fmls in that duty, the jury will 
never be "given the choice," Hansen, 734 P.2d at 428, of considering the appropriate 
outcome for the case. While the jury here was instructed to consider the alternative forms 
of manslaughter, it was not allowed to consider the facts in the context of whether 
Verne's conduct was unlawful and provoked Malcolm. That was error. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Malcolm respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the conviction and remand the case for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this *\ day of February, 2009. 
Linda M. Jones 
Rudy J. Bautista 
Stephen Howard 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc. 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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Page 2 (last) 
TabB 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-201 (2003) 
76-5-201 Criminal homicide —Elements —Designations of offenses. 
(1) (a) A person commits criminal homicide if he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, with 
criminal negligence, or acting with a mental slate otherwise specified in the statute defining the 
offense, causes the death of another human being, including an unborn child at any stage of its 
development. 
(b) There shall be no cause of action for criminal homicide for the death of an unborn child 
caused by an abortion. 
(2) Criminal homicide is aggravated murder, murder, manslaughter, child abuse homicide, ho-
micide by assault, negligent homicide, or automobile homicide. 
History: C. 1953, 76-5-201, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, §76-5-201; 1983, eh. 90, § 3; 1983, 
ch. 95, § 1; 1991, ch. 10, §7; 1991 (1st S.S.), ch. 2, § 1; 1995, ch. 291, § 6; 2002, ch. 327, § 1. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 2007) 
§76-5-203. Murder 
(1) As used in this section, "predicate offense" means: 
(a) a violation of Section 58-37d-4 or 58-37d-5, Clandestine Drug Lab Act; 
(b) child abuse, under Subsection 76-5-109(2)(a)? when the victim is younger than 18 
years of age; 
(c) kidnapping under Section 76-5-301; 
(d) child kidnapping under Section 76-5-301.1; 
(e) aggravated kidnapping under Section 76-5-302; 
(0 rape of a child under Section 76-5-402.1; 
(g) object rape of a child under Section 76-5-402.3; 
(h) sodomy upon a child under Section 76-5-403.1; 
(i) forcible sexual abuse under Section 76-5-404; 
(j) sexual abuse of a child or aggravated sexual abuse of a child under Section 76-5-
404.1; 
(k) rape under Section 76-5-402; 
(1) object rape under Section 76-5-402.2; 
(m) forcible sodomy under Section 76-5-403; 
(n) aggravated sexual assault under Section 76-5-405; 
(o) arson under Section 76-6-102; 
(p) aggravated arson under Section 76-6-103; 
(q) burglary under Section 76-6-202; 
(r) aggravated burglary under Section 76-6-203; 
(s) robbery under Section 76-6-301; 
(t) aggravated robbery under Section 76-6-302; 
(u) escape or aggravated escape under Section 76-8-309; or 
(v) a felony violation of Subsection 76-10-508(2) regarding discharge of a firearm or 
dangerous weapon. 
(2) Criminal homicide constitutes murder if: 
(a) the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another; 
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to another, the actor commits an act clearly 
dangerous to human life that causes the death of another; 
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human life, the 
actor knowingly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another and 
thereby causes the death of another; 
(d)(i) the actor is engaged in the commission, attempted commission, or immediate 
flight from the commission or attempted commission of any predicate offense, or is a 
party to the predicate offense; 
(ii) a person other than a party as defined in Section 76-2-202 is killed in the course of 
the commission, attempted commission, or immediate flight from the commission or 
attempted commission of any predicate offense; and 
(iii) the actor acted with the intent required as an clement of the predicate offense; 
(e) the actor recklessly causes the death of a peace officer while in the commission or 
attempted commission of: 
(i) an assault against a peace officer under Section 76-5-102.4; or 
(ii) interference with a peace officer while making a lawful arrest under Section 76-8-
305 if the actor uses force against a peace officer; 
(f) commits a homicide which would be aggravated murder, but the offense is reduced 
pursuant to Subsection 76-5-202(4); or 
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(g) the actor commits aggravated murder, but special mitigation is established under 
Section 76-5-205.5. 
(3)(a) Murder is a first degree felony. 
(b) A person who is convicted of murder shall be sentenced to imprisonment for an in-
determinate term of not less than 15 years and which may be for life. 
(4)(a) It is an affirmative defense to a charge of murder or attempted murder that the de-
fendant caused the death of another or altempted to cause the death of cinothcr: 
(i) under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which there is a reasonable 
explanation or excuse; or 
(ii) under a reasonable belief that the circumstances provided a legal justification or 
excuse for his conduct although the conduct was not legally justifiable or excusable 
under the existing circumstances. 
(b) Under Subsection (4)(a)(i) emotional distress docs not include: 
(i) a condition resulting from mental illness as defined in Section 76-2- 305; or 
(ii) distress that is substantially caused by the defendant's own conduct. 
(c) The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse under Subsection (4)(a)(i) or the 
reasonable belief of the actor under Subsection (4)(a)(ii) shall be determined from the 
viewpoint of a reasonable person under the then existing circumstances. 
(d) This affirmative defense reduces charges only as follows: 
(i) murder to manslaughter; and 
(ii) attempted murder to attempted manslaughter. 
Laws 1973, c. 196. § 76-5-203; Laws 1975, c 53, § 2; Laws 1977, c. 83. § 2; Laws 
1979, c. 74. § 1; Laws 1986, c. 157, § 1; Laws 1990, c. 227. § l:La\\s 199Lc. 10, § 9: 
Laws 1996. c 123, § L eff April 29. 1996: Laws 1999. c. 2. $ 2, eff. Mav 3. 1999: Laws 
1999. c. 90, $ 2, eff. Ma\ 3. 1999: Laws 2000, c. 101, $ h ^T. Ma\ L 2000; Laws 2000, 
c. 125, §3.cff.Ma> 1.2000; Laws 2003, c. 146, $ 1, eff Mav 5, 2003; Laws 2006, c. 
348. $2. eff. Mav L 2006; Laws 2007. c. 340, § 2. eff. April 30, 2007. 
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-403 (2008) 
§ 76-2-403. Force in arrest 
Any person is justified in using any force, except deadly force, which he reasonably be-
lieves to be necessary to effect an arrest or to defend himself or another from bodily harm 
while making an arrest. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-2-403. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-406 (2008) 
§ 76-2-406. Force in defense of property 
A person is justified in using force, other than deadly force, against another when and to 
the extent that he reasonably believes that force is necessary to prevent or terminate crim-
inal interference with real property or personal property: 
(1) Lawfully in his possession; or 
(2) Lawfully in the possession of a member of his immediate family; or 
(3) Belonging to a person whose property he has a legal duty 1o protect. 
CRKDIT(S) 
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UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
OCT 2 0 2008 
?.orP>Ol9>\-cA n. -n 
(Whereupon, the proceedings stood in noon recess; 
after which, at the approximate hour of 1:30 p.m., 
the following proceedings continued in the presence 
and hearing of the defendant but without the presence 
and hearing of the jury:) 
THE COURT: We're back on the record in State versus 
Malcolm. Counsel, have you had a chance to — all parties — 
well, the attorneys are present. The jury is not here. Have 
you had a chance to go through the jury instructions? 
MR. BAUTISTA: We have, your Honor. Your Honor — 
and they seem to be appropriate for what we asked originally, 
and then cover aspects that we asked; except there were three 
additional instructions that the court said that it was not 
inclined to admit, and I would like to have the court 
reconsider that, or have the benefit of the record for that — 
THE COURT: Sure — 
MR. BAUTISTA: — because I do not believe — 
THE COURT: — you1re welcome to it. 
MR. BAUTISTA: Thank you, your Honor. Your Honor, in 
this case, the instruction I had offered — and I will read it 
for the record, please --
A security guard, who is not a certified peace 
officer, has only the same rights and privileges 
afforded to any ordinary person. 
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II believe that's a true and correct statement of the law It1 s 
III in in i I«in | a i i l l P N ! Il In \\ In 1111 t h i i iiu'i iiiiiDii'p I hdiiii in i i u»i 1 i i i n . 
Peace officers, certified peace officers, hold a 
i I in f fe? i'lit' standard than normal citizens, especially when 
they're considered in positions of authority. 
1 " .ifraid that the j1' L. cy may consider the security 
guard in this case a person of li Lyh authority a nd they may 
• position where he is trained as a law enforcement 
officer ana can tell when, where ?~i 1 and if necessary what 
11"I detain someone, oi uu uoe physical force to 
arrest someone, 
There was evidence that people are sayinq that it 
appeared that I Iii :: Jenkins was trying to detain, Mi Malcolm, and 
bel li eve what that purpose -- and I think the j* lry needs to 
understand, and - *- - , -* be a- instruction -- that he is in no 
idi uust. ne s ctii ^ raj-nary citizen like 
anyone else. 
±ll regards to the next instruction, 
Any person I s justified in using reasonable force, 
e x c e p t deadly force, which he reasonably believes is 
~~~essary to effect an arrest. 
However, the person does so at Ins own peril and f;Iio 
arrest must be I  t- |. i I! Il ll: the arrest is determined to 
be invalid ox without. In, ,|I,;I I  11is L 1 1 : ,i tjai i o n ,  I hi -.' p JIII; i,-, in 
making the arrest loses this justification and may be 
subject to criminal prosecution for, amongst other 
charges, unlawful detention and assault. 
Depending on the circumstances, the person making the 
illegal arrest could be charged with aggravated 
assault. 
I think that's a true and correct statement of the law. The 
law allows a citizen to perform a citizen's arrest and use 
reasonable force to effect that. It may not be deadly force 
but they may use reasonable force. 
I'm afraid that the jury is going to believe that 
Mr. Jenkins was arresting Mr. Malcolm. Inasmuch, they're going 
to believe, if that's the case, then it was legal for him to be 
the aggressor in this altercation. 
And our argument, and I think there's evidence to 
support it, is that the first physical contact between these 
individuals was Mr. Jenkins touching Mr. Malcolm, not the other 
way around. 
And I'm afraid that the jury, if they believe that he 
had authority to arrest someone as a security guard, or if 
they're aware that citizens may make arrests, they may believe 
that it's okay for you to use reasonable force to arrest 
someone. 
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*  Therebyi" i f he was using reasonable force initially, 
*. I their -xgument won Id be, and if he was effecting an arrest, 
° • **-- M c Il • iioll in, 1 ia< I i 10 right to deiv::-J himself 
- I And I believe that this •« necessary t_ clarify f c-
r
 . .e jury so that, they can i inderst . tu I '. more 







Malcolm commi t i e d 1t . t':| ,ii i, '*.» i, 1 1 , p o s s xi;> J a I j g a II d i e 11:» 
o r a r r e s t by M_ . 
The v i d e o , 1 lie e v i d e n c e has been t "ui ' i i ia t l ie te i y by 
some of t h e w i t n e s s e s , but t h e e v i d e n c e was Mr, Malcolm, was 
asJceci i."ti l e a v e m ILCJ b t u i e , i u r u u i u u i. ui l u a v i ! mi i 
T H E COl l I 1 ' I"" II .".in ""I I d o e s n ' t . / o u r argument 
p r e c l u d e [.lie a d m i s s i o n Il t h e s e " I ill! • imi i Hill ill y mi . ny1 I llllian I 1 " 
j , e v i d e n c e of a r r e s t , t h a t " s what your argument i s ; Tha t 
h e r e was an a r i e a L Hindu , and mi mi , I I ' M . i H y i i i | I III i M I n 
r r e s t . 
Ill I I I III l . ' V l l III III " l l ' i i H i III III , I l l I III i ii. H I M ui 
ey believed -- r^
 J tlieie were witnesses who 
THE COURT: You heard one witness that testified thai 
i i i a 1 i l l i j f" In mi i happened 
MR. BAUTISTA: Hud again, we need the jury tn 
III III Il . ir i" »st~ 
There was un 
TTll'I POT.TFT Ht i H I I \ •" i iiialkia an a r r e s t if I'KF n a n 1 
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MR. BAUTISTA: In this situation, him physically 
grabbing Mr. Malcolm, when Mr. Malcolm committed no crime, was 
an assault. 
THE COURT: That may be true, but it doesn't mean 
it* s an arrest. 
MR. BAUTISTA: Well, without a jury instruction — 
well, again, because he's a security guard, they may believe he 
has some authority that they're not instructed on under the 
law. 
THE COURT: There's already evidence in the record 
that he was a security guard and that he was not a peace 
officer. 
MR. BAUTISTA: We don't know if they know the 
difference. We don't know — there are such things as 
certified security guards. For example, we had a prospective 
juror who was a security guard at the airport. She's a federal 
employee. They go through training and she is a 
higher-standard security guard, almost akin to a peace officer; 
but yet she said she's — 
THE COURT: Again, there's no evidence here, that 
I've heard so far, that — whether he is or isn't. He may be 
POST certified, but he certainly wasn't acting that way. 
MR. BAUTISTA: Well, your Honor --
THE COURT: So you want me to assume something I 
can't. There's no evidence for it. It assumes facts not in 
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1 evidence. 
2 I MR ID^JTISTA: Well, your Honor, when it's closing 
3 arguments, I argue to the jury that Mr Jenkins had no legal 
4 right to p] ace his hand on Mr. Malcolm, I believe that's a 
5 correct statement of the law. But wi thout a jury instruction 
g they are thereby instructed that anything I say is not evidence 
7 and not the law 
8 I Anu x^*«v- & a correct statement of the law. «*«j, j. 
9 believe that for hi m to have used force against Mr. Malcolr 
t ,_ |iac| to have justification. 
* Tf he didn't have a justificatior ^hen he was 
i assaulting w* Mal^^1m. 
foil1 re free to make that argument. 
MR. BAUTISTA: But again, that argument is muted 
I without having ar» -instruction +-o support it. 
1
 «*• COURT- ^^ ' s hecki. * -^ r- the State, 
<\ Y ° " LIIk Lha t this leads us in 
, A- ^xtr^m^ly confusing area lha- _s in fact not at aJ 1 
I quanriea 'aw as Mr T • sr» -is representing, and 1 s ads us 
r ) all th€*se questions that w« i ^ qoinq to fry to have the 
jury evali ;iikOcess«:i iy, 
Th^ question in this case is whether these '- » 
£.-iop.le
 i(l w i n i * * ,111 mm i/illi / s u v-i 1 HII I i i m 
r e a s o n a b l e t'nr Mi II"! Il Lin, t o u s e d e a d l y f o r c e b e c a u s e of Ith i ?n 
p h y s j .J J HI 111 »n La I i iiii 
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And you can lift Verne Jenkins right out of the 
uniform, and just look at them as two men who are scuffling. 
That's the real heart of this case, that physical scuffle, the 
circumstances of that physical contact; did it give rise to the 
use of deadly force? 
And I don't think we should give instructions to the 
jury that are going to be confusing, that are going to cause 
them to try to evaluate the circumstances that there is not 
clear evidence about. We donf t know that Verne Jenkins was 
trying to arrest. When the witnesses described him as trying 
to detain the defendant? We don't know they're using that in 
the technical term of "detained." 
It could just be that they're just trying to stop 
this person from moving, in that sense of the word "detained," 
not in the police-officer sense of the word "detain." 
It is a very vague and very confusing area. And to 
say that a security guard has no right to lay a hand on 
someone, when that security guard's whole job is to escort 
unruly customers off the premises? 
To say that there wasn't any other crime there, 
that's going to lead me into all kinds of arguments like "was 
Mr. Malcolm engaging in disorderly conduct? Was he in fact 
engaged in criminal trespass?" It just opens up a whole bunch 
of issues that are not really relevant to the heart of this 
case and will confuse the jury and distract us from what the 
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r e a l q u e s t i o n i s h e r e , 
THE COURT ."" ,. i esponse? 
Ml<, BAUTIS'J'A IIIIMe.;,!!! a ,„, / ir t l u n u r , I h a n k \ „ V 
Honor, t h e r e i s no c r i m e commit ted in t h i s s i t u a t i o n wh t Ill 
a l l o w e d Mi. , J e n k i n s 'ILu u1, phyw i (ia I I,n iu • m II Ii M a J c o ILiii 
I f he wai i t e d hi m t o l e a v e t h e s t o r e a person, may u s e 
r e a s o n a t n i e fo r ce t c ge 1: s :i iiieoi i€ t :: t e : : 1:1: .::i :i :i,a t : e t:::l: : ie i, i, ,i n i 11 ,i II 
i n t e r f e r e n c e w, i t h p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y Tha t i s c o r r e c t 
However1, y :>ii ca; : I: sell i: 1 i e l j > «= .: , I " :L E e for ce 
i m m e d i a t e l y . I f t h a t p e r s o n r e f u s e s t o l e a ve 1:1: len you can use 
f o r c e , i J : ic: h a t j i e r s : )i:i : L i k • s i ic • ^ I „ ,< j ^ i • jr i: i | >e i: • ^ 
a t t e m p t i n g tc , s on < :3i i u s e f o r c e ; ::>r i f t h a t p e r s o n i s a s a f e t y 
r i s k I ilJiei s m \ < uu se I I - -
THE COUR'l , I I , i s n ' t t h a t up f o r t h e j u r y t o 
d e c i d e ? 
MR BAUTISTAi Bu I I .1 .ey don11 know that, because 
II II» i l l i II II 111 I II II 11 i II 1 II I l J I II II < Ml I 11 II 111 II III ' I II 1 
THE COURT: IT M can they know what happened" Hobody 
i i i in ,i II uu i i i I  III mi II Ii I I M I I I ii i i , iiiiiuy' h i i «o wo II II " H mi d , 
I r M a l c o l m you ' r e now t r e s p a s f . i m IIII| i i»,,:ivo IIIIIII iniay n o t : iiii< 
i in i III III H M U S M in' il ii ii I \ l» I I I HI i II Ii nhr irly \H*A r i II i I ' irii" I "' '" ''"''iijii 
can a r g u e what YOU win I;. 
Ill I mi in III II III i n III i n II i III I i mi III in "i, in « . ( i i n ( III I 'm I n n o t no 
determine based on the evidence or; La« k o£ evidence, the facts 
in I III in "' , : i " ' . ' i j " .iiIIIi 1 i /II"! fin I happened ru m I idn " t hrif >| ii. 
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And maybe they'll have enough evidence; maybe they 
won't. That's the State's burden. 
But the fact of the matter is, as far as the jury 
instructions go, the jury instructions say any person — and 
that's exactly how Mr. Jenkins is to be viewed; is any person. 
And the jury instructions cover those. The only exception is 
to a peace officer, and there's been no evidence there's been a 
peace officer involved in this. 
So, you exclude a peace office and you're left with 
anybody else; whether they're a security guard, a store 
manager, or cashier. 
A cashier can say, "leave the premises." A security 
guard can say, "leave the premises." A manager can say, "leave 
the premises." They're all treated the same. 
MR. BAUTISTA: They may — they have the right to 
refuse service, and they have the right to tell someone to 
leave the property. But if that person is complying with that 
order, they may not then use force to evict that person. 
THE COURT: That's where we come back to what the 
jury is here to find out. 
MR. BAUTISTA: I understand that, your Honor, but 
that's the law, and that's why I'm asking the court to instruct 
the jury. There is no law that says you may use force against 
someone just because, if you order them to leave, and they 















THE COURT: I I III!, all of that is up to the jury to 
decide. 
MR. ^UTISTA: I understand that, but without the 
III aw H il thout the court instructing them on the Il i", i I T Il I »III II 
them what the law is they1re instructed not to believe me, 
And tadu xs> cne law. 
THE COURT: Wei1 ^ -1 m1-^ instructions as 
a whole, the court finds, uuvei u u s situatiun. They cover 
Mr. Jenkins as an ord i nary, everyday person, can be treated 
jn ist like anybo dy else. And what you want tu get in raises the 
specter of police officers, and t1-*--1-1^ not an element i n thi s 
case. So, I'm not going to give iu. 
MR. BAUTISTA: Thank you, your Honor Yoi lr Honor if 
x i Lead the final j.iA»ux:uction that we were discussing rj i 
~t had to do with reasonable force to evict someone fr on 
a property 
.— A_S justified in using reasonable force, 
other than deadly force,.against another, when and to 
the extent that he reasonably believes that force is 
necessary to prevent or terminate criminal 
interference with .teal property or personal property 
lawfully in his possession -' belonging to a person 
whose property »*?« » i , , Lo protect. 
However, a person may only use toice to t. em " 
1Q7 
person from real property if the person to be removed 
refuses to leave, damages property, or threatens the 
safety of others. 
Your Honor, I would ask these be incorporated in the record; if 
I may approach? 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. BAUTISTA: Your Honor, one other thing that just 
arose. When I was discussing about the jury instructions right 
now, the State indicated that they wanted the jury to lift Mr. 
Jenkins from his uniform, look at him as an ordinary citizen, 
and when this — during this confrontation, Mr. Malcolm had the 
right to use deadly force in his defense. 
I think that's almost akin to an ackowledgment by the 
State that this is not a first-degree murder and is, at most, a 
manslaughter. 
If that's the case — I know they haven't rested 
yet — but I would make, at this time, and ask the court to 
reserve decision for later, if it so decides, that this should 
be amended from — or, the count of murder in the first-degree 
should be dismissed. 
THE COURT: Based on what? 
MR. BAUTISTA: The State's just indicated that the 
question for the jury is to determine if Mr. Malcolm's use of 




Any person is justified in using reasonable force, except deadly force, which he 
reasonably believes to be necessary to effect an arrest, However, the person does so at 
his own peril It lasmuch the arrest must be legal. If the arrest is determined to be invalid 
or is without legal justification, the person making the arrest loses this justification and 
ma) be subject to criminal proseci ition for, amongst other charges i inla\ vft ill detention 
and assault. Depending on the circumstance, the person making the illegal arrest could 




A person is justified in using reasonable force, other than deadly force, against 
another when and to the extent tl lat 1 le i easoi lablj believes tl lat foi ce is necessai ) to 
prevent or terminate criminal interference with real property or personal property: 
1
^ ..*\:ui * ..- .lis possession; or 
z) belonging to a person whose property he has a legal duty to protect. 
However, a person may only use force to remove a person from,, real property if 
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Judge Paul Maughan 
INSTRUCTION 1 
Introduction 
The defendant is accused of committing one or more crimes. At the 
appropriate time as the jury you are to decide whether the defendant is guilty or not 
guilty. I will give you these instructions now and others at the conclusion of the 
evidence. You are to consider and follow all instructions. Please keep an open mind 
throughout the trial. 
. . r-x 
INSTRUCTION 2 
Information 
The prosecution has filed a document—called an "Information"—that contains 
the charges against the defendant. The Information is not evidence. It is only a 
method of accusing a defendant of a crime. The Information will now be read or 
summarized as follows: 
COUNT I 
CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, MURDER, a First Degree Felony, at 1953 West California 
Avenue, in Salt Lake county, State of Utah, on or about December 26, 2007, in 
violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 201, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, in that the defendant, Roger Allen Malcolm, a party to the offense, 
intentionally or knowingly caused the death of Verne Jenkins; and/or intending to 
cause serious bodily injury to another, committed an act clearly dangerous to human 
life that caused the death of Verne Jenkins; and/or acting under circumstances 
evidencing depraved indifference to human life, engaged in conduct which created 
a grave risk of death to another, and thereby caused the death of Verne Jenkins. 
INSTRUCTION 3 
Plea and Burden of Proof 
The defendant has entered a plea of not guilty and denies committing these 
crimes. Every crime has component parts called "elements." The prosecution must 
prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant does not have to 
prove anything. He does not have to testify, call witnesses, or present evidence. 
INSTRUCTION _4 
Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt 
The prosecution has the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Some of you may have served as jurors in civil cases, where you 
were told that it is only necessary to prove that a fact is more likely true than not true. 
In criminal cases, the prosecution's proof must be more powerful than that. It must 
be beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves 
you firmly convinced of the defendant's guilt. There are very few things in this world 
that we know with absolute certainty, and in criminal cases the law does not require 
proof that overcomes every possible doubt. If, based on your consideration of the 
evidence, you are firmly convinced that the defendant is guilty of the crimes charged, 
you must find him guilty. If, on the other hand, you think there is a rea possibility 
that he is not guilty, you must give him the benefit of the doubt and f nd him not 
guilty. 
i t >•» 
INSTRUCTION 5 
Presumption of Innocence. 
The law presumes that the defendant is not guilty of the crimes charged. This 
presumption persists unless the prosecution's evidence convinces you beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty. 
h/l 
INSTRUCTION 6 
Role of Judge, Jury and Lawyers 
All of us are officers of the court and have different roles during the trial: 
• As the judge I will supervise the trial, decide legal issues, and instruct you 
on the law. 
• The lawyers will present evidence and try to persuade you to decide the 
case in one way or the other. 
• As the jury, your role is to decide this case based on the law given in the 
instructions and on the evidence presented in court. Evidence usually 
consists of the testimony and exhibits presented at trial. 
INSTRUCTION 7 
Objections 
Rules govern what evidence may be presented to you. On the basis of these 
rules, the lawyers may object to proposed evidence. If I sustain the objection, the 
proposed evidence will not be allowed. If I overrule the objection, the evidence will 
be allowed. 
Do not evaluate the evidence on the basis of whether objections are made. 
I W . 
INSTRUCTION 8 
Order of the Trial 
The trial will proceed in the following manner. The prosecution will give its 
opening statement. An opening statement is an overview of the case fron one point 
of view, and summarizes what that lawyer thinks the evidence will show. Defense 
counsel will then be given an opportunity to make an opening statement. 
The prosecution will then present its evidence. The defendant may then present 
evidence, though the defendant has no duty to do so. After all of the evidence has 
been presented, I will give you final instructions on the law you must follow in 
reaching a verdict. You will then hear closing arguments from the lawyers. The 
prosecutor will speak first, followed by the defense counsel. Because the 
government has the burden of proof, the prosecutor is given the opportunity to give 
the last word. Finally, you will deliberate in the jury room to discuss the case and 
reach a verdict. 
i i -^ \ 
INSTRUCTION^ 
Conduct of Jurors 
From time to time I will call a recess. During recesses, do not talk about the 
case with anyone—not family, not friends, nor each other. Until the trial is over, do 
not mingle or talk with the lawyers, parties, witnesses or anyone else connected with 
the case. Court clerks or bailiffs can answer general questions, such as the length of 
breaks or the location of restrooms, but they cannot comment about the case. The 
goal is to avoid the impression that anyone is trying to influence you improperly. If 
people involved in the case seem to ignore you outside of court, they are just 
following this instruction. 
Until the trial is over, do not read or listen to any news reports about this case. 
If you observe anything that seems to violate this instruction, report it immediately 
to a clerk or bailiff. 
INSTRUCTION 10 
Note-taking 
Feel free to take notes during the trial to help you remember the evidence, but 
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Judge Paul Maughan 
INSTRUCTION /I 
Juror Duties 
You have two main duties as jurors. 
The first is to decide from the evidence what the facts are. In deciding the facts 
you are not to be influenced by pity or prejudice for or against the defendant. You 
must not be biased against the defendant because he has been charged with these 
offenses, or because he has been brought to trial. These facts are not evidence and 
you are not to speculate from them that the defendant is more likely guilty than not. 
The second duty is to take the law I give you in the instructions, apply it to the 
facts, and decide if the prosecution has proved the defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
You are bound by your oath to follow the instructions that I give you, even if 
you personally disagree with them. This includes the instructions I gave you before 
trial, any instructions I may have given you during the trial, and these instructions. 
All the instructions are important, and you should consider them as a whole. The 
order in which the instructions are given does not mean that some instructions are 
more important than others. You are to be governed solely by the evidence and the 
law in these instructions. You are not to be influenced by sentiment,,conjecture, 
sympathy, passion, prejudice, or public feeling. You are to consider and weigh the 
evidence conscientiously and dispassionately, and apply the law in reaching a just 




As the judge, I am neutral. If I have said or done anything during the trial that 
makes you think I favor one side or the other, that was not my intention. Do not 
interpret anything I have done as indicating that I have any particular view of the 
evidence or the decision you should reach. 
INSTRUCTION /» 
Lawyers as Advocates 
The lawyers are advocates and they represent their respective clients. When 
they give their closing arguments, keep in mind that they are advocating their views 
of the case. What they may have said at any time during these proceedings and what 
they say during their closing arguments is not evidence. If the lawyers say anything 
about the evidence that conflicts with what you remember, you are to rely on your 
memory of the evidence. If they say anything about the law that conflicts with these 
instructions, you are to rely on these instructions. 
INSTRUCTION /V 
Evidence 
You must base your decision only on the evidence that you saw and heard here 
in court. 
Evidence includes: 
• what the witnesses said while they were testifying under oath; 
• any exhibits admitted into evidence; and 
• stipulations of the parties regarding evidence. 
Nothing else is evidence. 
In reaching a verdict, consider all the evidence as I have defined it. You may 
also draw all reasonable inferences from that evidence. 
INSTRUCTION K 
Direct/Circumstantial Evidence 
Facts may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence. The law does not 
treat one type of evidence as better than the other. 
Direct evidence can prove a fact by itself. It usually comes from a witness who 
perceived firsthand the fact in question. For example, if a witness testified he looked 
outside and saw it was raining, that would be direct evidence that it had rained. 
Circumstantial evidence is indirect evidence. It usually comes from a witness 
who perceived a set of related events, but not the fact in question. However, based 
on that testimony someone could conclude that the fact in question had occurred. For 
example, if a witness testified that she looked outside and saw that the ground was 
wet and people were closing their umbrellas, that would be circumstantial evidence 
that it had rained. 
Before you can find the defendant guilty of any charge, there must be enough 
evidence—direct, circumstantial, or some of each—to convince you of the 
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It is up to you to decide. 
INSTRUCTION / I 
Witness Credibility 
In deciding this case you will need to decide how believable each witness was. 
Use your own common sense, good judgment, and experience. Let me suggest a few 
things to think about as you weigh each witness's testimony: 
• How good was the witness's opportunity to see, hear, or otherwise observe 
what the witness testified about? 
• Does the witness have something to gain or lose from this case? 
• Does the witness have any connection to the people involved in this case? 
• Does the witness have any reason to lie or slant the testimony? 
• Was the witness's testimony consistent over time? If not, is there a good 
reason for the inconsistency? If the witness was inconsistent, was it about 
something important or unimportant? 
• How believable was the witness's testimony in light of other evidence 
presented at trial? 
• How believable was the witness's testimony in light of human experience? 
• Was there anything about the way the witness testified that made the 
testimony more or less believable? 
In deciding whether to believe a witness, you may also consider anything else 
you think is important. 
You do not have to believe everything that a witness said. You may believe 
part and disbelieve the rest. On the other hand, if you are convinced that a witness 
lied, you may disbelieve anything the witness said. In other words, you may believe 
all, part, or none of a witness's testimony. You may believe many witnesses against 
one or one witness against many. 
In deciding whether a witness testified truthfully, remember that no one's 
memory is perfect. Anyone can make an honest mistake. Honest people may 
remember the same event differently. Where there is conflicting testimony, it is your 
duty to reconcile the conflict as far as you can, but you are to determine for 
yourselves the truth of the case. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 17 
Defendant Testifying 
The defendant testified at trial. Another instruction mentions some things 
for you to think about in weighing testimony. Consider those same things in 
weighing the defendant's testimony. Don't reject the defendant's testimony merely 
because he or she is accused of a crime. 
INSTRUCTION )Cj 
Offense Requires Conduct and Mental State 
A person cannot be found guilty of a criminal offense unless that person's 
conduct is prohibited by law, AND at the time the conduct occurred, the defendant 
demonstrated a particular mental state specified by law. 
"Conduct" can mean both an "act" OR the failure to act when the law requires 
a person to act. An "act" is a voluntary movement of the body and it can include 
speech. 
The prosecution must prove that at the time the defendant acted, he did so with 
a particular mental state. For each offense, the law defines what kind of mental state 
the defendant had to have, if any. For some crimes the defendant must have acted 
"intentionally" or "knowingly." For other crimes it is enough that the defendant acted 
"recklessly," with "criminal negligence," or with some other specified mental state. 
INSTRUCTION /*/ 
Inferring the Required Mental State 
The law requires that the prosecutor prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant acted with a particular mental state. 
Ordinarily, there is no way that a defendant's mental state can be proved 
directly, because no one can tell what another person is thinking. 
A defendant's mental state can be proved indirectly from the surrounding facts 
and circumstances. This includes things like what the defendant said, what the 
defendant did, and any other evidence that shows what was in the defendant's mind. 
INSTRUCTION ^ 
Motive 
A defendant's "mental state" is not the same as "motive." Motive is why a 
person does something. Motive is not an element of the crimes charged in this case 
and does not need to be proven. 
However, a motive or lack of motive may help you determine if the defendant 
did what he is charged with doing. It may also help you determine what his mental 
state was at the time. 
INSTRUCTION ->\ 
Definition of "Intentionally" 




Definition of "Knowingly" 
A person acts "knowingly" or "with knowledge" when the person is aware that 
his conduct is reasonably certain to cause a particular result. 
"Conduct" means either an act or an omission. 
\ / J 
INSTRUCTION » 
Definition of "Recklessly" 
A person acts "recklessly" when he is aware of a substantial and unjustifiable 
risk that his conduct will cause a particular result, consciously disregards the risk, and 
acts anyway. 
The nature and extent of the risk must be of such a magnitude that disregarding 
it is a gross deviation from what an ordinary person would do in that situation. 
"Conduct" means either an act or an omission. 
INSTRUCTION iJ\ 
Definition of Unlawfully 
"Unlawfully" means without legal justification. 
\\<L 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ 
An act committed or an omission made under an ignorance or mistake of fact 
which disproves the culpable mental state is a defense for that crime. 
tiffi 
INSTRUCTION ^ 
Do Not Consider Punishment 
In making your decision, do not consider what punishment could result from 
a verdict of guilty. Your duty is to decide whether the defendant is guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Punishment is not relevant to whether the defendant is guilty or not 
guilty. 
INSTRUCTION NO. n 
Before you can convict the defendant of the crime of Criminal Homicide, Murder, you must 
find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following elements: 
1. In Salt Lake County, on or about December 26, 2007, the defendant, Roger Allen 
Malcolm; 
2. a) while acting intentionally or knowingly, or 
b) while acting with the intent to cause serious bodily injury to the person, 
committed an act clearly dangerous to human life which, or 
c) while acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to 
human life, he knowingly engaged in conduct which created a grave risk of death to 
another; and 
3. Unlawfully; 
4. Caused the death of Verne Jenkins. 
If there is a reasonable doubt about any single element, you should find the defendant Not 
Guilty of Criminal Homicide, Murder. 
If, on the other hand, you find all the above elements proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you 
should then consider whether the defendant caused the death of Verne Jenkins under circumstances 
which would justify reducing the charge of Murder to Manslaughter. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1// 
You are instructed that there are two ways in the case before you in which you may find 
the defendant guilty of Manslaughter instead of Murder in Count I. 
Murder may be reduced to Manslaughter if you find that the defendant caused the death 
of Verne Jenkins under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which there is a 
reasonable explanation or excuse. 
Additionally, Murder may be reduced to Manslaughter where the defendant caused the 
person's death under a reasonable belief that the circumstances provided a legal justification or 
excuse for his conduct although the conduct was not legally justifiable or excusable under the 
existing circumstances. 
INSTRUCTION NO. * H 
Before you can convict the defendant of the crime of Manslaughter based on extreme 
emotional distress, you must find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following 
elements: 
1. In Salt Lake County, on or about December 26, 2007, the defendant, Roger Allen 
Malcolm; 
2. a) while acting intentionally or knowingly, or 
b) while acting with the intent to cause serious bodily injury to the person, 
committed an act clearly dangerous to human life which, or 
c) while acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to 
human life, he knowingly engaged in conduct which created a grave risk of death to 
another; and 
3. Unlawfully caused the death of Verne Jenkins, 
4. Under extreme emotional distress and there was a reasonable explanation for the 
distress. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the truth 
of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the 
defendant guilty of Manslaughter. If, on the other hand, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable 
doubt of any one or more of the foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 7 
In considering the matter of the affirmative defense of acting under extreme emotional 
distress for which there is a reasonable explanation as covered in the preceding Instruction, you are 
instructed that a defendant does not have to establish such defense by any burden of proof. Rather, if 
there is some evidence which tends to show that the defendant acted under extreme emotional 
distress, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act under such 
extreme emotional distress. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ?\ 
Extreme emotional distress does not include a condition resulting from mental illness, or 
distress that is substantially caused by the defendant's own conduct. 
The "extreme emotional distress" must be triggered by something external to the accused, 
and his reaction to such external stimulus must be reasonable. The terms used must be given the 
meaning you would give them in common everyday use. Such distress, therefore, cannot have 
been brought about by the defendant's own peculiar mental processes, or by his own knowing or 
intentional involvement in a crime. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ? 
The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse for the stress shall be determined from the 
viewpoint of a reasonable person under the then existing circumstances. 
\1ln 
INSTRUCTION NO. Y> 
Before you can convict the defendant of the crime of Manslaughter based on imperfect legal 
justification, you must find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following 
elements: 
1. In Salt Lake County, on or about December 26, 2007, the defendant, Roger Allen 
Malcolm; 
2. a) while acting intentionally or knowingly, or 
b) while acting with the intent to cause serious bodily injury to the person, 
committed an act clearly dangerous to human life which, or 
c) while acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to 
human life, he knowingly engaged in conduct which created a grave risk of death to 
another; and 
3. Unlawfully caused the death of Verne Jenkins; 
4. Under a reasonable belief that the circumstances provided a legal justification or 
excuse for his conduct; 
5. Although the conduct was not legally justifiable or excusable under the existing 
circumstances. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the truth 
of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the 
defendant guilty of Manslaughter. If, on the other hand, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable 
doubt of any one or more of the foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
In considering the matter of the affirmative defense of acting with imperfect legal 
justification, you are instructed that a defendant does not have to establish such defense by any 
burden of proof Rather, if there is some evidence which tends to show that the defendant acted 
under circumstances where he believed he was entitled to defend himself although under the law he 
was not entitled to use deadly force, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant did not act under such circumstances. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 5^ 
The reasonableness of the defendant's belief that the circumstances provided a legal 
justification or excuse for his conduct shall be determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person 
under the then existing circumstances. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2 ^ 
There are several alternative means of arriving at the crime of Manslaughter included in 
the definition of Manslaughter. You are instructed that you must consider whether the 
prosecution has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed any of the 
alternative types of Manslaughter on the date in question. The law requires that all jurors 
unanimously agree that the prosecution has proven one particular variation of Manslaughter. If 
all jurors unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed a particular 
type of Manslaughter, you must so indicate by putting an X on the verdict form beside the 
variation proven. If you are not unanimously convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed one particular type of Manslaughter, you must find Mr. Malcolm not guilty 
of Manslaughter. 
INSTRUCTION NO. Y\ 
If you have a reasonable doubt as to whether Roger Allen Malcolm is guilty of the crime 
of Criminal Homicide, Murder as charged in the information, you may consider whether he is 
guilty of the lesser included crime of Negligent Homicide. 
However, before you can convict Roger Allen Malcolm of the crime of Criminal 
Homicide, you must find from all of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt, each of the 
following elements of that offense: 
1. In Salt Lake County, on or about December 26, 2007, the defendant, Roger Allen 
Malcolm; 
2. Acted with criminal negligent; and 
3. Unlawfully; 
4. Caused the death of Verne Jenkins. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced that the 
prosecution has proven each of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must 
find Roger Allen Malcolm guilty of Criminal Negligence. If, on the other hand, you are not 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the foregoing elements, then you 
must find Roger Allen Malcolm not guilty of that offense. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ $ 
You are instructed that in every crime or public offense, there must be a union or joint 
operation of the act and the actor's mental state. A person is only guilty of an offense when his 
conduct is prohibited by law and he acts with the culpable mental state as established by law. 
Before a defendant may be found guilty of a crime, the evidence must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant was prohibited from committing the conduct charged in the 
information and that the defendant committed such conduct with the culpable mental state 
required for such offense. 
"Conduct" means an act or omission. 
"Act" means a voluntary bodily movement and includes speech. 
"Omission" means a failure to act when there is a legal duty to act and the actor is capable 
of acting. 
The term "unlawful" or "unlawfully" means contrary to law or without legal justification. 
A person engages in conduct "intentionally," or with intent or willfully with respect to the 
nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to 
engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
Acting "intentionally" is more than acting "knowingly", "recklessly" or with "criminal 
negligence." 
A person engages in conduct "knowingly," or "with knowledge," with respect to his 
conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his 
conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts "knowingly," or "with knowledge," with 
respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause 
the result 
A person acts "recklessly" with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the 
result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must 
be of such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of 
care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the 
actor's standpoint. 
With "criminal negligence," a person acts with respect to circumstances surrounding his 
conduct or the result of his conduct when he ought to be aware of or "should have known" of a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk 
must be of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation 
from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise in all the circumstances as 
viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ 
You may find Roger Allen Malcolm not guilty of any offense, but you may not find him 
guilty of both Murder and any of the lesser included offenses of Manslaughter or Negligent 
Homicide. Mr. Malcolm can only be guilty of one crime. 
INSTRUCTION NO. M^ 
(1) A person is justified in threatening or using force against another when and to the extent 
that he or she reasonably believes that force is necessary to defend himself or a third person 
against such other's imminent use of unlawful force. However, that person is justified in using 
force intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily injury only if he or she reasonably 
believes that force is necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury to himself or a third 
person as a result of the other's imminent use of unlawful force, or to prevent the commission of 
a forcible felony. 
(2) A person does not have a duty to retreat from the force or threatened force described in 
paragraph (1) above if the person is in a place in where he has lawfully entered and remained. 
INSTRUCTION NO. MJ/ 
A person is not justified in using force if he: 
(a) initially provokes the use of force against himself with the intent to use force as an excuse to 
inflict bodily harm upon the assailant; 
(b) is attempting to commit, committing, or fleeing after the commission or attempted 
commission of a felony; or 
(c) was the aggressor. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
In determining imminence or reasonableness under Subsection (1), the trier of fact may consider, 
but is not limited to, any of the following factors: 
(a) the nature of the danger; 
(b) the immediacy of the danger; 
(c) the probability that the unlawful force would result in death or serious bodily injury; 
(d) the other's prior violent acts or violent propensities; and 
(e) any patterns of abuse or violence in the parties' relationship. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
A "forcible felony" includes, among other things, aggravated assault, kidnaping, robbery, 
burglary. In addition, any other felony offense which involves the use of force or violence 
against a person so as to create a substantial danger of death or serious bodily injury also 
constitutes a forcible felony. 
"Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes serious permanent 
disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or 
creates a substantial risk of death. 
w 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ 
An aggravated assault can be committed in two manners. It occurs when a person assaults 





To justify acting in self-defense, it is not necessary that the danger was real, or that the 
danger was impending and immediate, so long as the defendant acted as a reasonable person in 
the defendant's position. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
The right of self-defense exists only as long as the threatened danger would appear to 
exist to a reasonable person in the defendant's position. When the danger would no longer 
appear to exist to a reasonable person in the defendant's position, the right to use self-defense 
ends. 
INSTRUCTION NO. J± 
You are instructed that in passing on the conduct of the defendant, you should not judge 
him by the light of after-developed events nor hold him to the same cool and correct judgment 
which you are able to form, but you should put yourselves in his place and judge his acts by the 
facts and circumstances by which he was surrounded. 
f 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^g 
You are instructed that conduct which is justified, or is done in self-defense, is a defense 
to prosecution for any offense based on the conduct. 
If you find that Mr. Malcolm was justified in using force in self-defense for any of the 
above reasons, you should find him not guilty of the charges against him. 
INSTRUCTION NO. L\\ 
You are instructed that the laws of Utah do not require a defendant to establish self-
defense by a preponderance or greater weight of the evidence. Once the issue of self-defense is 
raised, whether by the prosecution's witnesses or those of the defense, the prosecution has the 
burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the act was not done in self defense. The 
defendant has no particular buiden of proof but is entitled to be found not guilty if there is any 
basis in the evidence from either side sufficient to create a reasonable doubt as to whether he 
acted in self-defense. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
A security guard who is not a certified peace officer has only the same rights and 
privileges afforded to any ordinary person. 
\QcS 
INSTRUCTION 5 ° 
Jury Deliberations 
In the jury room, discuss the evidence and speak your minds with each other. 
Open discussion should help you reach a unanimous agreement on a verdict. Listen 
carefully and respectfully to each other's views and keep an open mind about what 
others have to say. I recommend that you not commit yourselves to a particular 
verdict before discussing all the evidence. 
Try to reach unanimous agreement, but only if you can do so honestly and in 
good conscience. If there is a difference of opinion about the evidence or the verdict, 
do not hesitate to change your mind if you become convinced that your position is 
wrong. On the other hand, do not give up your honestly held views about the 
evidence simply to agree on a verdict, to give in to pressure from other jurors, or to 
just get the case over with. In the end, your vote must be your own. 
In reaching your verdict you may not use methods of chance, such as drawing 
straws or flipping a coin. 
INSTRUCTION 4 \ 
Juror Notes Versus Independent Recollection of Evidence 
Your notes are only intended to be a help to your memory. They should not 
take precedence over your own independent recollection of the evidence. Moreover, 
those jurors who have not taken notes should rely on their own memory of the 
evidence and should not be influenced by the fact that another juror has taken notes, 
since the notes are only for the note taker's personal use in refreshing his or her 
memory of the evidence. 
INSTRUCTION NO. h ^ 
When you retire to deliberate, you should appoint one of your number to act as a foreman and 
to preside over your deliberations. Your verdict(s) must be in writing, signed and dated by your 
foreman and when found must be returned by you into court. A written form for each of the possible 
verdicts will be furnished to you. 
Regarding Count I in the Information, the verdict in this case must be EITHER: 
GUILTY OF MURDER, 
01 
NOT GUILTY, as your deliberations may result; 
OR 
GUILTY OF MANSLAUGHTER, because Roger Allen Malcolm acted; 
a) Under extreme emotional distress ; or 
b) On imperfect legal justification . 
OR 
NOT GUILTY, as your deliberations may result; 
OR 
GUILTY OF NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE 
2E 
NOT GUILTY, as your deliberations may result; 
This being a criminal case, it requires a unanimous concurrence of all jurors to find a verdict. 
When your verdict(s) has/have been found, notify the bailiff that you are ready to report to the 
Court. 
INSTRUCTION < 3 ^ 
Procedure After Reaching a Verdict 
Once your deliberations have concluded and the verdict forms have been 
signed, notify the bailiff that you have reached a verdict without revealing your 
verdict. The foreperson shall keep the verdict in his or her possession ur til I instruct 
you otherwise. 
DATED this day of June, 2008. 
Judge Paul Mai 
Third Judicial District Court 
